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Professor James hopes to give to the world before he leaves it, a more systematic and rigorous exposition of his philosophical views. When he does so, we trust that he will supply explicit information regarding some very essential things that he has here left unsaid. When a philosopher says that such and such a thing is not explanation, that nothing that science and human ingenuity can devise is explanation, we have a right to ask of him what *he* regards as explanation, and to challenge him to give an *example* of what would satisfy *his* explanatory yearnings. If nothing can satisfy them, we shall be perfectly justified in committing them to the care of the epistemological pathologist. The same criticism is applicable to all such assertions as that "facts are opaque," that at bottom there is only "mere fact and givenness," that "of experience as a whole no account can be given," etc. To these assertions every man, whose opinions are thus impersonally assailed by a philosopher, may rightly reply: "If facts are opaque, give me an example of what you regard as translucent; if 'mere fact and givenness' is insufficient, what sort of rationality, or 'non-fact,' or 'non-givenness,' would you, just by way of instance, replace it by; if 'otherness' bothers you, what sort of a feeling would you regard as a cure of your ailment, not in order that I may supply it, but in order that I may share your joy at your discovery and escape being belabored by you for not being a companion in your misery; in fine, you have only the right to denounce my way of explaining things on condition of your indicating either positively or negatively a better way."

Such is one of the questions that a positive philosophy will seek to answer. From his position as well as his genius we have a right to expect such an attempt from Professor James. It is not by brilliant destructiveness that the highest philosophic conquests are made, but by positive acquisitions. In *The Will to Believe* Professor James has shown the Hume side of his genius; in his next work let him display the Kantian; and then the glory will be ours of having accomplished in a life-time what it took "effete" Europe a century to achieve. T. J. McCORMACK.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PLATO'S LOGIC WITH AN ACCOUNT OF PLATO'S STYLE AND OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WRITINGS. By *Wincenty Lutoslawski*. Longmans.

On peut être honnête homme et faire mal des vers. One may be a very clever and learned man and write a perverse book in support of a fantastical theory. Mr. Lutoslawski is a clever and versatile man as his ability to write correctly and vigorously in four or five languages proves. His industry and gifts of rapid acquisition are sufficiently evidenced by the short time he has taken to study and extract if not to assimilate Plato and an enormous mass of technical literature about Plato. But his big book on the origin and growth of Plato's logic is a tissue of fallacious reasoning, wrought on the frame of an impossible method. This the sober critic is compelled to say despite his admiration of Mr. Lutoslawski's talent; and having said it he is bound to prove it by citation and indisputable fact.

The problem which Mr. Lutoslawski undertakes to solve is the exacter determination of the chronology of the Platonic dialogues. In a general way it is known and agreed that the *Laws* is Plato's latest work; that the minor Socratic dialogues are for the most part early; that the *Republic* occupies an intermediate position; that the *Symposium* was written soon after the year 385, and that the *Timæus* falls between the *Republic* and the *Laws*. The place of the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Statesman* and *Philebus* has been much debated. Zeller still assigns them to a supposed Megarian period of Plato's development preceding the *Republic*. Of late the consensus of scholars tends to put them after the *Republic*. This conclusion is made probable by the general resemblance of style and vocabulary to the *Laws*, by a certain loss of dramatic vivacity replaced by an affected heavy elaboration of style, and by the concentration of the interest on problems of classification, dialectic and the metaphysical criticism or interpretation of the theory of ideas. The last argument, however, must not be pressed too much. The stress of attention is altered; but the problems and solutions of these metaphysical dialogues are not merely foreshadowed but distinctly suggested in the *Republic*, *Theætetus*, *Phædrus*, *Cratylus* and *Euthydemus*. This fact makes it forever impossible to base a detailed chronology of Plato's writings upon any theory of the necessary evolution of his thought. There are certain metaphysical problems which the play of primitive thought converts into vexatious logical fallacies. Plato devoted two or three dialogues to an analysis intended to dispose of these fallacies forever. This task he may have undertaken at any time after reaching his maturity. The conceptions were always present to his mind, as might be proved by citations from the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, and *Republic*. To determine dogmatically the time he selected for working them out in their most explicit form we must look for other evidence. This evidence Mr. Lutoslawski finds in the statistics of style interpreted by what he calls the science of stylometry. Tabulating with laudable industry the observations found in some thirty or forty miscellaneous studies of Plato's style, which he accepts without verification, he establishes a list of some five hundred stylistic peculiarities including such features as the use of a particular rare or technical word, the preference for this or that type of adverbial phrase or interrogatory formula, the frequency of some particular word formation, or the use of a philosophic term in some special sense. The *Laws* being the latest of Plato's writings the relative dates of other presumably late works may be roughly determined by the percentage to the page of the peculiarities which they have in common with it. This latest group, the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, *Timæus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* may be similarly used as a standard of comparison for all other dialogues.

In the application of this method Mr. Lutoslawski displays great ingenuity. He distinguishes accidental, repeated, important and very important peculiarities. A very important peculiarity scores four accidental peculiarities, an important peculiarity three. In this way a coefficient of chronological affinity is worked out to two places of decimals for every important dialogue. The *Laws* is credited with

718 units of peculiarity of the later style. The *Apology* with only 16 units has a relative affinity of 0.02. The *Phædo* with 0.21 is later than the *Symposium* with 0.14.

There is not much profit in debating this method with Mr. Lutoslawski. We may grant his general contention that it is ideally possible for "science" or rather omniscience to determine the dates of a series of writings by this method and yet remain sceptical of his ability to prove in this way that the *Symposium* necessarily preceded the *Phædo*. Mr. Lutoslawski accepts his facts in the lump from previous investigators. Some experience with Platonic "literature" moves me to say that I should hesitate to base the slightest inference on any amount of such "facts" without independent verification.

The evidential value of a stylistic "peculiarity" may depend wholly on the question of the dependence of style on subject matter, and who is to estimate that? Take for example the feature of "apodictic" answers,—answers that express a strong assent. Of what value are statistics that ignore the fact that such answers will be most frequent where Socrates is arguing with a friendly or consenting interlocutor? And more generally, what confidence can we place in the entire method before it has been tested in detail on some body of writings whose dates are known, but not known to the experimenter, and before in this way some definite canons of psychological probability in the matter have been established?

From this elusive subject then I gladly turn to the second and larger division of the book in which our author endeavors to confirm the results of the stylometric method by tracing the necessary order of development of Plato's logic. Here again it is impossible to join issue on the general proposition.

It is *a priori* possible that Plato's philosophy and more particularly his perception of elementary logical principles were in a continuous state of development and transformation throughout his fifty years of intellectual life. It is psychologically conceivable that, as Mr. Lutoslawski affirms, he at first regarded the ideas only as Socratic general notions, then hypostatized the idea of beauty alone in the *Symposium*, elevated this hypostasis in the *Phædo* to ethical and mathematical ideas and even to ideas of manufactured objects in the *Republic*, and then in the *Theætetus* and *Parmenides* abandoned this doctrine for the view that the ideas are merely the concepts of a mind. But it is also possible that Plato's thought was fixed in its main outlines before he reached the age of forty, and that he habitually throughout his writings treats all general concepts as transcendental ideas whenever it suits the theme, the rhetoric, or the mood of the hour. The second view I believe to be correct, because I find no passages in Plato inconsistent with it. The former I deem erroneous, because those who maintain it are always driven to foist upon Plato distinctions not found in his text, and almost invariably garble and mis-translate their quotations in excess of the measure permissible to human fallibility. Here we enter upon the domain of verifiable facts. In order to prove that in the *Timæus* the ideas are nothing else than God's thoughts, Mr. Lutoslawski translates

νόησει μετὰ λόγον περιληπτόν, "which exist in reason" (p. 474), or "included in thought" (p. 477). It means, of course, apprehended by pure reason in contradistinction to sense. On page 403 the drift of the argument in *Parmenides*, 132 C, is utterly misapprehended, the quotation is garbled, and the answer of Socrates, misquoted, is pieced on to a portion of the question of Parmenides, to whom the whole is attributed. On page 288, ἐν τῷ εἶδει, *Rep.* 402 C, meaning "in the body," is interpreted "in ideas." On page 329 the severity of the *Republic* is contrasted with the leniency of the *Phædo* on the ground that according to the latter the murderer of his father might be pardoned after a year. It is the man who strikes his father. On page 383, *Theætetus*, 155 A, B, is grossly misinterpreted. Socrates merely says of certain contradictory beliefs that they contend with one another in us,—in our souls. This is interpreted: "The axioms are here said to be *in the soul*, whereby it becomes clear that we are no longer dealing with transcendental ideas as in the *Phædo*, but with subjective notions." The theory of ideas is obviously not in question at all. On page 464 a sentence from *Philebus*, 13 A, is utterly misrepresented. The Greek means: don't trust this (fallacious) argument that blends in indiscriminating unity the most opposite things." Our author's interpretation is: "We must not attempt a reconciliation of all contradictions."

Mistakes of this character, though easier to detect and demonstrate, are as nothing compared with the false points, mistaken inferences, irrelevant parallels, unwarranted distinctions and arbitrary assertions that abound throughout the work. I will venture a few illustrations in spite of the lack of space to support them by argument. On page 201, *Crito*, 47 A, is cited to show that in the earlier dialogues Plato estimates a judgment according to its moral value without postulating an intellectual standard of truth. The point is a false one as the entire context shows. On the very next page, 48 A, Plato speaks of the "truth in itself" in the same connexion. On page 206, *Protagoras*, 356 E, is wrested from its proper application. On page 210, *Euthydemus*, 289 B, is utterly misconceived in the paraphrase: "Plato is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge that he would not give it up even for immortality," etc. On page 211 it is sheer nonsense to say that the hypothetical method taught in the *Meno* is employed in *Euthydemus*, 284 A and 287 E. On page 213 three citations are slightly garbled or docked. On page 232, *Gorgias*, 461 E, is quoted to illustrate the narrowness of Plato's earlier patriotism as compared with the more cosmopolitan tone of later writings. The words are ironical. But the point is a false one anyway. On page 229, *Cratylus*, 433 E, and *Politicus*, 261 E, have nothing to do with each other. Page 239, the new meaning of philosophy, "first explained in the *Symposium*," is explicitly stated in *Lysis*, 218 A. Indeed, all the points made on the changes in the meaning of "philosophy" and "dialectic" throughout the book are false ones. Page 250, Plato does not affirm in *Phædo*, 82 C, that the philosopher becomes equal to the gods, but that he goes to dwell with them. On page 284 the stress laid on the peculiar position of justice in the republic is fallacious. Plato or any Greek who had read

Theognis, 147, at school could at any time make justice the virtue *par excellence*. Cf. *Gorgias*, 477 C and 527 B. On page 317, *Republic*, 602 D, is quoted as a distinct advance on the thought of the *Phædo*. But the passage is almost identical with *Protag.*, 356 D, which our author thinks earlier than the *Phædo*. Page 373, the innocent phrase, *Theætetus*, 184 C, D, "soul or whatever we must call it," is pressed to this result: "In earlier work Plato used the term soul as free from every ambiguity. Here we see already a trace of doubts about the existence of the soul," etc. A comparison of *Crito*, 48 A, and *Symposium*, 218 A, will show that the phrase is a harmless literary flourish.

Obviously this sort of thing is endless. There is no limit to the false points that can be made about a subtle dramatic writer like Plato by means of irrelevant parallels, confident assertions that this or that idea occurs for the first time in such or such a place, and exaggeration of the significance of casual phrases in disregard of the total context. The illustrations here given are not one fourth of those noted. I do not wish to seem discourteous. Mr. Lutoslawski's book, as I said in the beginning, shows him to be a very clever man. There is room for interminable debate as to the value of his general method and his conception of Plato's development. But his reasoning from page to page is a series of fallacies resting on misapprehensions of the fair meaning of the text and context of his author. That is a fact. And a critic surely should be permitted to state facts.

PAUL SHOREY.

LA STRUCTURE DU PROTOPLASMA ET LES THÉORIES SUR L'HÉRÉDITÉ. By *Yves Delage*, Professeur à la Sorbonne. Paris: C. Reinwald & Co. (Schleicher Frères). Pp., xiv+878.

As all roads lead to Rome, so do the current problems of biology find their focus in the problem of the cell. The present volume embodies the most important results which have been reached by the eager and almost feverish researches of the last decade upon the structure and physiology of the ultimate optical unit of living matter.

Professor Delage devotes some most interesting pages to a statement of the reasons that induced him to undertake his laborious task. From the point of view of method he would distinguish four great periods in zoölogy: the first period being typified in the studies of the external form and markings of organisms, undertaken by such workers as Aristotle, Linné, and Buffon, and extending into the early part of the present century. The second period is distinguished by the recognition of the necessity for delving deeper into the recesses of the organism; many observers had felt this need, but Cuvier was the first to stamp dissection as a real method of investigation and to carry it out to its logical consequences. The impulse given by Cuvier lasted for half a century and has not yet spent its force. A third period, however, may be said to have begun with the establishment of marine laboratories, which introduced a different method of work as important as those that had gone before and